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Abstract: Network reliability and resilience has become a key design parameter for network operators and Internet service 
providers. These often seek ways to have their networks fully operational for at least 99.999% of the time, regardless of the number 
and type of failures that may occur in their networks.
This article presents a continuous-time Markov chain model to characterise the prop-agation of failures in optical GMPLS rings. 
Two types of failures are considered depend-ing on whether they affect only the control plane, or both the control and data planes of 
the node. Additionally, it is assumed that control failures propagate along the ring infect-ing neighbouring nodes, as stated by the 
Susceptible-Infected-Disabled (SID) propagation model taken from epidemic-based propagation models. A few numerical examples are 
per-formed to demonstrate that the CTMC model provides a set of guidelines for selecting the appropriate repair rates in order to 
attain specific availability requirements, both in the control plane and the data plane.1. Introduction
Network reliability and failure resilience has become a
major concern for Internet service providers and network
operators. Indeed, network operators often seek ways to
provide the so-called five-nine reliability level, meaning
that the objective is to have a fully operational network
for at least 99.999% of the time. There are several methods
and techniques for dealing with failures so that service
continuity is either not compromised in the first place, or
it is quickly restored [1,2].
Current networks integrate multiple transport tech-
nologies so that the whole system follows a stacked mul-
tilayer architecture, whereby the upper layers operate on
virtual topologies built successively upon structures pro-
duced in the lower layers [3]. Generalised Multi-Protocol
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protocol suite of choice for managing such heterogeneous
networks [4].
GMPLS facilitates the interoperation and convergence
of disparate transport technologies through a unified con-
trol plane, and aims at easing challenging aspects such
as service provisioning, traffic engineering and failure re-
covery [5]. Despite the fact that a multilayered architec-
ture can improve network resilience as it brings flexibility
to fault management and recovery [6,7], it introduces an
undesirable effect known as failure propagation, whereby
failures at the bottom layer may disrupt services in higher
layers. Besides this, due to the nature of the multilayer
architecture, one failure at the bottom layer can manifest
itself as several concurrent failures in higher layers.
The majority of the approaches to network recovery
assume that the number of failureswhose repair is pending
at any given time is small (e.g., one or two), and that
they occur independently fromone another. The treatment
of this type of failure is extensive in the literature, and1
all aspects of network design and operation are well
covered. However, not such extensive research has been
conducted on scenarios of arbitrary large-scale and/or
multiple failures. Such failures are usually caused by
natural disasters or intentional attacks, and thus are much
rarer than, say, cable cuts or malfunctioning of hardware
modules, but their consequences are often much severer.
This paper aims at furthering our understanding of the
impact on the availability of a GMPLS-based network
subject to a specific form of multiple failures, namely, the
one that spreads from one node to its neighbours through
the control plane, possibly affecting a considerable part of
the network topology.
A key feature of GMPLS is the separation of the control 
plane from the data plane, to the point that they can even 
be deployed on separate networks. Due to this separation, 
failures may occur in either of the two planes, or in both 
simultaneously [8]. A failure in the control plane leads 
to the loss of control functionality (e.g., a switch/node 
becomes unmanageable), while a data plane failure affects 
packet-forwarding services [9]. In multilayer architectures, 
this separation of planes not only brings many benefits, 
but also a new requirement: the need for resilience in 
the control plane [8,10]. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no study has been published for a scenario in 
which a control plane failure on a node ultimately provokes 
a failure in the data plane, that is, a situation in where an 
inter-GMPLS plane failure propagation exists.
The objective of this paper is therefore to characterise
the transient behaviour and possible states of a GMPLS-
based optical ring subject to a multiple failure scenario,
where the propagation of failures occurs simultaneously
on two axis: horizontally in the control plane, from node
to node, and vertically from the control plane towards the
data plane. A continuous-timeMarkov chainmodel is used
for assessing the reliability of such ring topology.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows: In
Section 2, GMPLS-based network failures are explained.
Section 3, introduces the Susceptible-Infected-Disabled
(SID) model, which is the basis of the error propagation
model introduced in Section 4. Then, Section 5 depicts
some numerical results as an example applied on a eight-
node ring. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work reviewing
its main contributions and findings.
2. Related work and problem statement
2.1. Failure propagation in multilayer networks
The negative effects of failure propagation can be
avoided or limited by having the network’s lower layers
automatically finding or using new paths or subpaths after
a failure, provided they have their own protection mecha-
nisms. Thus, recovery procedures can be automatically ac-
tivated upon failure transparently to the upper layer [11].
A different approach is to design the higher-level
network topology taking into account the capabilities and
constraints of the network’s lower layers. Thus, when
designing IP over WDM networks, traffic demands from
the IP layer are allocated over the WDM infrastructure
such that, in case of node failure or fibre cut, (a) theIP topology is still connected, and (b) there is enough 
capacity to successfully complete the recovery at the 
IP layer. This problem is often referred to as network 
mapping (or survivable mapping) and is known to be 
NP-complete [11]. Several heuristic algorithms have been 
proposed in the literature to find such mappings, or to 
augment the topologies until the appropriate mapping is 
found, see for instance some related works: [12–14], or the 
more general studies: [15,3,16–19].
Most of the research in survivable optical networks, 
including those concerned with multilayer networks, as-
sume that failures occur independently from one another. 
Thus, instances of failures such as fibre cuts and node 
malfunctioning are usually modelled as isolated and un-
related events. Furthermore, as multiple failures are con-
sidered possible but rare [20], the focus tends to be on 
single failures, and on single link failures in particular, with 
only a few studies tackling the design of networks capa-
ble of withstanding up to double link failures. Nonethe-
less, one specific form of multiple link failure that attracted 
much attention is that resulting from damages to phys-
ical structures, such as ducts, that are shared by other-
wise unrelated fibre links. The concept of ‘‘Shared Risk 
Link Groups’’ [21,22] and its generalisation ‘‘Shared Risk 
Resource Groups’’ (SRRG) [23], capture this situation and 
have been used extensively in network survivability de-
sign. However, this study addresses the case of failure 
propagation across nodes in a networks, which is a very 
different topic to the classical network reliability analysis 
with isolated (and uncorrelated) failures.
Many more disrupting failures, however, can be found 
in the real world. These include the ones in which the 
malfunctioning can propagate through the network, or 
cover a large geographical area, thus affecting several 
completely unrelated network elements simultaneously. 
Root causes of such large-scale failures are typically natural 
disasters [24,25], but can also be virus/worms outbreaks 
as well as intentional attacks [26]. Although the literature 
on large-scale failures is vast in the context of the study 
of complex networks (see for example [27–29] and the 
references therein), far less research is published on the 
modelling or the analysis of such failures in data networks. 
Some well-published catastrophic failures are analysed 
in [30,31] but they are not directly applicable to transport 
networks, as they address the impact on the IP layer of the 
global Internet.
Geographically correlated network failures affecting 
specific locations are studied in [32,33]. They provide 
models to evaluate reliability on given failure scenarios so 
as to determine the most vulnerable areas of the physical 
network. The focus is on the structural properties of given 
topologies and their ability to withstand localised disasters 
caused by non-propagating failures.
2.2. Failures in GMPLS-based networks
Usually, when GMPLS networks are considered (i.e. op-
tical networks), it is possible to distinguish two different 
parts in every node (see Fig. 1). First of all there is a for-
warding component where specifically designed hardware 
is dedicated to processing, as quickly as possible, incoming2
Fig. 1. The control and data planes in the GMPLS architecture.data packets to their corresponding output ports in accor-
dance with a forwarding table. Above this component there 
is a generic control hardware executing a specific network 
operating system that runs the routing and signalling pro-
tocols and configures the forwarding table (when connec-
tions are established or released). Although both compo-
nents are usually located in the same device, they have 
some degree of isolation from one another. They can even 
be placed in different devices and have the control mes-
sages sent through a different network [8].
In such scenarios it would be possible for an attack
or failure to only affect the control component or only
the forwarding component, for a short or mid span. It
is even possible that, due to a virus, targeted attack or
software configuration error, the failure only affects to a
single control plane mechanism (i.e. signalling protocol or
routing protocol). In the case that the signalling module
fails and the routing module is still working, connections
cannot be established or removed through that node. In
this case it is possible to use the routing module to advise
the neighbours that there is no free capacity available
so they do not attempt to establish new connections
through the partially failed node. On the other hand, if
the signalling module is still operational but the routing
module fails, changes in the local state (e.g. capacity
being allocated/released) will not be advertised to the
neighbours and they will be working with out-of-date
information. However, the failed node could still be able to
process new connection requests and tear down existing
connections.
In this work we assume that a control plane failure
involves both signalling and routing failures. In this
case, it is not possible to establish/release connections,
and neighbours will work with out-of-date information
whenever a control failure occurs. However, it is possible
that, for some time, the forwarding component continues
working properly with the forwarding table configured
appropriately for the connections established before the
failure. It would also be possible that, some time after the
control plane failure, the data plane also fails thus causing
a complete node failure and a disruption of the established
connections through that node.
It is of major importance to establish somemechanisms
in order to recover the functionality of the failed control
component as soon as possible and re-synchronise the
control and forwarding components. This can be achievedby nodes implementing re-synchronisation mechanisms 
like Non-Stop Forwarding and Graceful Restart [34,35]. 
This is not easy to accomplish and may take some time 
due to a first stage of reinstalling or rebooting the control 
component and the necessary procedures and protocol 
messages for that re-synchronisation [10].
The issue of resilience of the control plane in GMPLS 
networks is attracting some attention. In [36], time 
related signalling parameters are studied to optimise fault 
detection and control overhead in optical rings. The impact 
of RSVP-TE and OSPF-TE message loss (i.e., messages for 
signalling and routing) is studied in [37]. The analytical 
model presented in [38] can be used to quantify the 
number of links required in the control plane topology so 
that the probability of losing a connection set-up or tear 
down is below some value.
Unlike the above-referenced papers, in this work we 
address the scenario in which failures can propagate, 
through the GMPLS control plane from one node to its 
neighbours, and once the control plane functionality is 
affected, it is possible that the data plane is affected as well 
thus creating the two-dimensional failure propagation 
scenario discussed in the introduction. We focus on optical 
ring networks for two reasons: First, they are widely 
deployed as part of several transport technologies and are 
commonly found in metropolitan area networks [15,39]. 
Second, their structure lend itself amenable to the 
study of the evolution of failures and the effects on 
reliability through continuous-time Markov chains, as will 
be discussed in the following sections.
2.3. Failure propagation based on epidemic models
Considering that the failures of interest in this paper 
are those that propagate, epidemic models can be used 
to characterise the dynamics of the spreading of failures. 
The term ‘‘epidemic network’’ has been used to describe 
and study how an epidemic evolves on a set of individuals 
during a certain amount of time, both in contact networks 
of biological individuals and in computer networks (see 
for example [40,41] and the references therein). The 
rise and decline of an epidemic may be probabilistically 
characterised, and definitely depends upon the infection 
propagation rate and the node connection degree [42]. 
Research in this area involves the study of different aspects, 
including how the epidemic evolves over time or how to3
immunise part of the population in order to minimise and
control the epidemic propagation and its effects. Examples
of networking applications where epidemic network
models may apply include power supply networks, social
networks, neural networks or computer networks.
A large number of epidemic models have been proposed 
to characterise the propagation of viruses in complex 
systems, mainly biological. A good review can be found 
in [43]. In this paper, we assume that failures propagate 
according to the SID model recently published by the 
authors in [44], and described in 2.2. Such studies 
presented a simulation-based study of the robustness of 
mesh topologies under the risk of SID based failures. This 
work completes [44] providing the analytical study of SID 
on ring topologies, and provides design rules for the repair 
rates required to achieve a given service availability goal.
3. The SID (Susceptible-Infected-Disabled) model
This section defines the states associated to each node,
and the implications of being in each state from the func-
tional point of view. Additionally, the assumptions made
about failure spontaneous generation and propagation,
necessary for developing the CTMC model in the next sec-
tion, are also given.
• The S state, stands for ‘‘susceptible state’’. In this state,
both the control planes and the forwarding planes of
the GMPLS node operate properly, hence the node is
susceptible to becoming infected (i.e. suffering a failure)
if at least one of its neighbours is already infected.
Additionally, the node may fail spontaneously, which
means that the node is creating a new infection.
• The I state stands for ‘‘infected state’’. In this case,
the GMPLS control plane is faulty, but the forwarding
plane continues working properly. The node cannot
participate in the establishment of new LSPs nor it is
able to modify the current configuration of its LSPs.
However, the traffic of already active LSPs may still be
forwarded. A node in this state may propagate errors to
its neighbours.
• The D state stands for ‘‘disabled state’’. In this case,
both the control and forwarding planes are faulty.
Error propagations to adjacent cannot occur since node
communication is disrupted.
Fig. 2 shows the state-transition diagram for the SID 
model, where the values on the arrows refer to the 
transition rates between states (the number of transition 
events that occur per unit of time). Essentially, Fig. 2 states 
that a node susceptible to being infected (a node that is 
working properly, i.e. on state S) becomes infected at rate 
β (if there exists at least one neighbouring node already 
infected). An infected node may become again operational 
(S state) or disabled (D state). The first case occurs at rate 
δ, which is the rate at which the network administrator 
fixes the problem, whereas the second case occurs at rate 
c. The network operator may also repair disabled nodes at 
rate t. Finally, βF refers to the spontaneous failure rate at 
which a given node in the network, whose neighbours are 
not infected, may actually become (spontaneously) 
infected. The rate value of βF is much smaller than β, so it 
does notFig. 2. State-transition-rate diagram for the SID model.
Table 1
Summary of notation and parameters of the SID model.
Parameter Description
βF Spontaneous Infection rate
β Infection propagation rate
δ Control plane repairing rate
c Disabling rate
t Repairing rate of disabled nodes
appear in the calculation of the corresponding infection 
rate for simplicity but also because we are considering 
the following behavioural hypothesis: when one node 
has just had a control plane failure (infection), no more 
isolated nodes are allowed to have control plane failures 
spontaneously, but rather only by infection propagation. 
Table 1 summarises the parameters of the SID model.
It is important to remark that, in this scenario, the
epidemic spreading of failures happens only among
entities of the control plane, that is, the inter-plane failure
propagation (from the control plane to the data plane) is
not epidemic, rather it is the consequence of assuming that
a certain proportion of nodes in the ‘‘infected’’ state cannot
be repaired (returned to the ‘‘susceptible’’ state), at which
point the data plane (the whole node, in fact) also fails.
4. Analysis
4.1. Continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) model
In this work, failure events in an individual node are 
assumed to occur independently from one another and to 
exhibit the memoryless property, which means that inter-
failure times are exponentially distributed. This behaviour 
is assumed for all possible events that may occur in the 
scenario: control plane failures (infection propagation), 
data plane failures (node disabled), control plane repairs 
and complete node repairs (becoming operational from 
the disabling state). Then, the use of a continuous-time 
Markov chain to model the propagation of failures along 
the GMPLS ring is very suitable. Basically, continuous-time 
Markov chains (CTMC) are easily characterised by the so-
called state-transition-rate diagram (Fig. 2), which is a graph 
showing the system’s possible states, along with directed 
arcs that represent the transition rates (in failure or repair 
events per unit of time) between states. In this section, we 
use a CTMC whose states represent all the failure situations 
that could possibly occur in a GMPLS ring of eight nodes.4
Additionally, the model’s transition rates between states 
are related to the failure propagation rates in the SID model 
of Fig. 2.
The state-transition-rate diagram gives the infinitesi-
mal generationmatrixQ , which characterises the transient
behaviour of the CTMC. In this work, the matrix Q will be
used to study the steady-state probabilities (that is, the
percentage of time that the ring is in a given configuration
in the long run) and the first-passage times of a given state
(that is, the amount of time on average to reach a given
state from some other).
Essentially,withQ , the steady-state solution for a CTMC
requires solving pi from the following set of equations:
piQi =
−
j≠i
Qijpj, i ∈ C (1)
where−
j∈C
pj = 1 (2)
and
Qi = −
−
j̸=i
Qij (3)
where pi is the steady-state probability of state i, C is the
state space and Qij is the transition rate from state i to state
j, as specified in matrix Q . The values of pi give the amount
of time that, in the long run, the CTMC stays on each state.
Additionally, the Q matrix allows the computation of the
expected transition time between any two nodes of the
Markov chain. The first-passage time from state i to state
k (hereafter mik) is the mean time to reach state k for the
first time given that the process started in state i, and is
computed solving the following set of equations:
mik = 1Qi +
−
j≠k
Qij
Qi
mjk, i, j, k ∈ C (4)
where Qi =∑j≠i Qij.
4.2. An eight-node ring study case
Fig. 3 shows an eight-node GMPLS ring network to be 
modelled by a CTMC. The CTMC model is based on the 
following assumptions:
(1) Already infected nodes may infect only neighbouring
nodes. Basically, a node may be infected only if it has
at least one neighbouring node already infected. The
first infection occurs spontaneously (βF ).
(2) Already infected nodesmay become disabled. Disabled
nodes cannot infect other nodes, nor can they propa-
gate their disabling state to other nodes.
(3) Both infected and disabled nodes may be repaired
by the administrator, but only if they are adjacent
to a susceptible node. In other words, node repair
strategies occur at the edges of the infected/disabled
area.
In light of this, Fig. 4 shows the complete state-transition-
rate diagram of a CTMC model for the ring topology shownFig. 3. The eight-node GMPLS-based ring example.
in Fig. 3. Each state is labelledwith the triple (NIl : ND : NIr),
where ND refers to the number of disabled nodes (nodes
in state D), and the NIl and NIr side denotes the number
of infected nodes (nodes in state I) on the two sides of
the disabled node. When ND = 0 (that is, no nodes are
in state D), then the state notation may be reduced to
(0 : 0 : NIr). For instance, state (0 : 1 : 1) denotes the case
of one disabled and one infected node next to the disabled
one, regardless of their absolute position in the ring (by
convention NIl ≤ NIr ).
As an example, consider the ring of Fig. 3. Initially, the
ring is in state (0 : 0 : 0) as there is no node in either
the infected or disabled state. This is illustrated in Fig. 5(a).
At some point in time, one node becomes spontaneously
infected as depicted in Fig. 5(b). This occurs at rate 8βF and
brings the ring to the state (0 : 0 : 1). From there on, the
infected node may cause the transition to:
• the state (0 : 1 : 0) if it becomes disabled which occurs
at rate c. This case is illustrated in Fig. 5(c).
• the state (0 : 0 : 2) if the infection is passed on to a
neighbour. This occurs at rate 2β (See Fig. 5(d)) because
the infected nodemay infect either of two neighbouring
nodes.
• the state (0 : 0 : 0) (Fig. 5(a)), if the network operator
repairs the node and returns it to the susceptible state.
The rate of this transition is δ, which is the repairing
rate.
Taking a closer look at the state (0 : 0 : 2), we can see that
the possible transitions from there on are:
• to the state (0 : 0 : 3)when an additional adjacent node
becomes infected (see Fig. 5(e)), which again occurs at
rate 2β .
• to the state (0 : 1 : 1) if one of the two infected nodes
become disabled, which occurs at rate 2c (see Fig. 5(f)).
• to the state (0 : 0 : 1) if one of the two infected nodes
is repaired. This occurs at rate 2δ (see Fig. 5(b)).
In contrast, from state (0 : 1 : 0), no new infections de-
velop because disabled nodes do not propagate infec-
tion. Therefore, the only possible transition is to the state5
Fig. 4. State-transition-rate diagram for the SID model of an eight-node GMPLS ring.(0 : 0 : 0)when repairing actions are taken by the network
operator.
The remaining states and transition rates can be easily 
computed, thus yielding Fig. 4. In the figure, there is a 
special state denoted as ‘‘DISC’’. This state comprises a set 
of many states: All states with more than one disabled node 
(that is, x : D : y for D > 1 and any values of x and y) 
and all states with no susceptible nodes (that is 0 : 0 : 8 
and 0 : 1 : 7). Such a ‘‘Disconnection’’ state represents the 
case where the network operator must take urgent repair 
action. We consider that the network operator is capable of 
restoring a disconnected network at rate tR. The value of tR 
is considered to be much smaller than t in order to take into 
account that ‘‘Disconnected’’ networks are much harder to 
repair. Finally, the goal of this study is to design the repair 
rates δ and t to have the ring in the ‘‘Disconnection’’ state 
less than 99.999% of the time.
Table 2 shows the infinitesimal generation matrix Q8 for 
this particular CTMC, as obtained from the state-transition-
rate diagram of Fig. 4. The empty gaps are zeros, excepting
the diagonal values:
Qii =
−
j≠i
Qij.
4.3. A general model for GMPLS rings with N nodes
From the case with eight nodes, it is easy to infer the 
following rules in constructing the infinitesimal generation 
matrix QN as it is shown in Table 2, for a ring with a general 
number of nodes N. These rules are summarised in Table 3.
5. Numerical results
5.1. Performance metrics
Next, we study the steady-state probability of a number
of key sets of states in the CTMC, which represent different
types of network malfunctioning (see Fig. 6). Such key
states are:• Fully Operational, (0 : 0 : 0) state: This is the state
at which all nodes in the ring work properly, but are
susceptible to spontaneous infection. It is characterised
by P(0:0:0), that is, the percentage of time at which the
ring has all its nodes fully functional.
• Moderate Infection, (0 : {0, 1} :< NI,max) state: This
set contains all the states of the ring where the number
of infected nodes is smaller than some value NI,max,
and the number of disabled nodes is either 0 or 1.
This case is characterised by Plow,I which is the sum of
the steady-state probabilities of all states meeting such
a condition. This group of states refer to a moderate
infection propagation along the ring and should be
considered by the administrator as a potential case of
severe network infection.
• Severe Infection, (0 : {0, 1} :> NI,max) state: This set
contains all the states of the ring where the number
of infected nodes exceeds some value NI,max, and the
number of disabled nodes is either 0 or 1. This case
is characterised by Phigh,I , the sum of the steady-state
probabilities meeting such a condition. This group of
states refers to a severe infection propagation along the
ring and should be considered by the network operator
as the previous stage towards network disconnection.
• Disconnection, (DISC) state: this is the state in which
the ring has more than one disabled node, or all its
nodes are infected. In such a case, there are at least two
nodes that cannot communicatewith each other, which
is unacceptable to most network operators. This case is
characterised by PDISC , that is, the percentage of time at
which the ring has two or more disable nodes, or all the
ring nodes are infected.
The value of Nl,max may be chosen between 0 and N . In
the numerical examples we use Nl,max = N/2, that is,
we consider that the severe infection state begins when at
least 50% of nodes in the ring have some kind of failure.
Such groups of states are shown in Fig. 6. The 
‘‘Fully Operational’’ state is marked using a pentagonal6
(a) 0:0:0. (b) 0:0:1.
(c) 0:1:0. (d) 0:0:2.
(e) 0:0:3. (f) 0:1:1.
Fig. 5. Different ring states: (a) (0:0:0), (b) (0:0:1), (c) (0:1:0), (d) (0:0:2), (e) (0:0:3) and (f) (0:1:1).7
Table 2
Infinitesimal generation matrix for an eight-node GMPLS ring (Q8).Table 3
Transition generation rules for QN .
Ring state
From To Qij Condition
(0 : 0 : 0) (0 : 0 : 1) NβF
(0 : 0 : 1) (0:1:1) 0
(0 : 1 : x) (0 : 1 : x+ 1) β x > 0
(y : 1 : x) (y : 1 : x+ 1) β x ≥ y, y ≥ 0
(y : 1 : x) (y+ 1 : 1 : x) β x ≥ y, y ≥ 0
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 0 : x+ 1) 2β x ≥ 1
(x : 1 : x) (x : 1 : x+ 1) 2β x ≥ 0
(0 : 0 : N − 1) DISC 2β
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 1 : 0) c x ≥ 1
(0 : 0 : x) ( x−12 : 1 : x−12 ) c x odd and x ≥ 2
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 1 : x− 1) 2c x ≥ 1
(0 : 0 : x) (y : 1 : x− y− 1) 2c y = 1, 2, 3, . . . while y ≤ x
(y : 0 : x) DISC (x+ y)c
(0 : 1 : N − 2) DISC (N − 2)c + β
(y : 1 : N − y− 2) DISC (N − 2)c + 2β
(0 : 1 : x) (0 : 0 : x) t
(0 : 0 : 1) (0 : 0 : 0) 2δ
(x : 1 : x) (x− 1 : 1 : x) 2δ x ≥ 1
(0 : 0 : x) (0 : 0 : x− 1) δ x ≥ 2
(y : 1 : x) (y : 1 : x− 1) δ x > y
(y : 1 : x) (y− 1 : 1 : x) δ x > y > 0shape. States belonging to the ‘‘Moderate Infection’’
group use square-shaped boxes while ‘‘Severe Infection’’
ones are surrounding by an elliptical shape. Finally the
‘‘Disconnection’’ is clearly marked with a rounded-corner
rectangle.
Additionally, it is of interest to study the average first-
passage times to any of the threemalfunctioning groups of
states to see how often these situations arise from a fully
functional state (0 : 0 : 0).The following numerical examples study these perfor-
mance metrics in detail.
5.2. Steady-state probability results
After solving the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC-
based model, it is easy to show the percentage of time
that the ring stays in every set of states as a function of
the two repairing rates: the rate δ, at which the control8
DISC
Operational
Moderate infection
Disconnection
Severe infection
Fig. 6. Groups of states under study.Fig. 7. Impact of t on the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC for the eight-node GMPLS ring.plane of a node is repaired (this is, transition rate from
the Infected state to the Susceptible state of a node) and
the rate t at which nodes are fully repaired (transition
rate from the Disabled state to the Susceptible state). The
units of all the rates are normalised as the amount of
transitions events (failures or reparations) that occur in an
infinitesimal period of time in the CTMC model.
Numerical results are plotted for different values of δ,β ,
t and c. The figures use the following notation: Subindex
‘‘000’’ is used for the Fully Operational state, subindex
‘‘HighI’’ represents the Severe Infection case, ‘‘LowI’’ isused for Moderate Infection results and finally ‘‘DISC’’ here
refers to the Disconnection state results.
Fig. 7 shows the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC 
for the eight-node GMPLS ring for different values of δ, β , c 
and t . The control and data plane repair rate value is fixed 
at c = 1 repair per unit of time (e.g. hour) for all four plots. 
The two upper plots consider δ = 5 (control plane repair 
rate) while the two lower plots consider δ = 100. The two 
plots on the left consider a fixed value of β = 1 (infection 
rate), while the two plots on the right consider a fixed β = 
20 value. Several conclusions arise from this figure: First,9
Fig. 8. Impact of δ on the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC for the eight-node GMPLS ring.the four scenarios show an almost constant steady-state 
probability, regardless of the value of t (almost horizontal 
lines). Second, the upper-left and lower-right figures have 
the same β/δ = 1/5 ratio and show very similar steady-
state probabilities. Only the bottom-left plot of Fig. 7 
shows a reasonably low PDISC value, which has a β/δ = 
1/100 low value. Essentially, the ratio β/δ is the key in 
having a sufficiently low value of PDISC as shown in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8 considers the value of t = 0.5 (top plots) and t = 
50 (bottom plots) for different infection rates β = 1 (left 
plots) and β = 20 (right plots). The plots show similar 
behaviour with decreasing disconnection probability PDISC 
for large values of δ for different values of β. Essentially, in 
order to achieve a disconnection steady-state probability 
below 10−5, δ > 4 × 102β when β = 1 is required (Fig. 8 
top- and bottom-right) and δ > 4 × 103β when β = 20 
(Fig. 8 top- and bottom-left). Hence, it is safe to have a 
repairing rate δ about three orders of magnitude larger 
than the infection rate β, i.e. δ > 103β to guarantee 
99.999% network availability.
5.3. First-passage times: MTTF and MTTR
This section studies the first-passage times of the
three malfunctioning groups of states: Moderate infection,
Severe infection andDisconnection, starting from state (0 :
0 : 0). This is referred to asMean Time To Failure (MTTF) as
it gives the average time to reach each state starting from
the fully operational state (0 : 0 : 0), as computed from
Eq. (4).
As shown in Fig. 9, the behaviour is again independent 
of t (upper and lower figures look the same). Again, the 
message is that, in order to have a failure after 105 units 
of time, the value of δ must be large enough in comparison 
with β , that is of about three orders of magnitude larger.Finally the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) analysis is 
shown in Fig. 10. This figure gives the average time 
required to get to state (0 : 0 : 0) from any of the 
malfunctioning groups of states. In order to achieve very 
low MTTR values (in the order of 10−2 units of time), the 
values of δ are required to be several orders of magnitude 
larger than β .
5.4. A GMPLS ring with 32 nodes
This section shows numerical results for a large-size 
ring of 32 nodes. Using the rules inferred in Section 4.3, the 
infinitesimal generation matrix Q32 is calculated and hence 
the steady-state probabilities for the CTMC model are 
resolved for the 32-node ring. Fig. 11 shows the ratio δ/β 
(y-axis) required to achieve a certain service unavailability 
(x-axis), assuming different combinations of β and t. As 
shown, for a desired service unavailability of 10−5 the 
value of δ must be between 102 and 103 times the value of 
β. This conclusion was also obtained from the analysis of 
the eight-node ring of the previous section. This provides a 
rule for network operators in the design of their δ value 
strategy.
6. Summary and conclusions
This work has presented a CTMC model to characterise
the transient behaviour and possible states of GMPLS-
based networks with ring topology whose nodes may
become infected or disabled following the SID failure
propagation model. A full set of numerical examples has
been presented, focused on analysing the resulting steady-
state probabilities alongwith theMean Time To Failure and
Mean Time To Repair values for a selected number of δ
and t repair rates on two GMPLS rings of 8 and 32 nodes,
respectively.10
Fig. 9. Mean time to failure (MTTF) results.Fig. 10. Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) results.The presented CTMCmodel can help network operators
in finding the required repair rates of control and data
planes δ and t tomaintain a certain level of availability, say
99.999%. Additionally, the model can be used for studying
the sensitivity of the network to different combinations of
failure and repair rates, in terms of the expected number of
nodes in each state of the SID model (Susceptible, Infected
or Disabled).
As it is concluded from the numerical examples
conducted with rings of different sizes, a good design
rule is to have the repair rate of infected nodes δ much
larger (about three orders ofmagnitude) than the infection
rate β . Basically, when δ is so large with respect to βwe have infected nodes which are repaired very quickly,
minimising the probability of infecting others.
This is clearly seen from the next example: When the
CTMC moves from state (0 : 0 : 0) to state (0 : 0 : 1),
then the next movement is either to (0 : 0 : 2), (0 : 1 : 0)
or back (0 : 0 : 0), with rates 2β , c and δ respectively. By
keeping δ ≫ (2β + c), the network operator ensures that
the infection propagates to neighbouring nodes with very
little probability, only:
2β
2β + δ + c .
Hence, the network operator must ensure that δ ≫ β
in order to avoid infection propagation.11
PDISC
δ/
β
Fig. 11. Impact of δ/β in the steady-state probabilities of the CTMC for
the 32-node GMPLS ring.
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